**Directions for Attracting Investment in the Activities of Electricity Supply Enterprises in Uzbekistan: Institutional Reforms and Empirical Evidence**

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Abstract. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to identify and systematize the key directions for attracting investment into electricity supply enterprises in Uzbekistan, with a particular focus on transmission and distribution segments, and to empirically assess the role of institutional reforms and tariff cost-recovery policies in shaping investment outcomes.Design/methodology/approach. The study employs a mixed-method research design combining qualitative institutional analysis with an exploratory econometric approach. Project-level data on renewable energy capacity awarded through competitive public–private partnership (PPP) tenders during 2019–2024 are used as a proxy for investment attractiveness. A linear regression model is estimated to examine the relationship between cumulative investment outcomes, time trends, and tariff cost-recovery reforms, supported by descriptive and comparative analysis of regulatory developments. Findings. The results indicate a strong positive time trend in investment commitments, reflecting growing investor confidence following sector reforms. While tariff cost-recovery improvements constitute a necessary condition for long-term financial sustainability, their short-term statistical impact on investment volumes is limited. Instead, transparent PPP mechanisms, international financial institution (IFI) guarantees, and risk-mitigation instruments emerge as the primary drivers of investment growth in Uzbekistan’s electricity supply sector. Research limitations/implications. The analysis is constrained by the limited availability of consistent time-series data on direct investment flows into electricity supply enterprises, necessitating the use of proxy indicators. Future research could employ panel data at the utility level or incorporate longer post-reform time horizons to better capture lagged effects of tariff reforms. Practical implications. The findings suggest that policymakers should complement tariff reforms with distribution-level incentive restructuring, digital metering and loss-reduction programs, and expanded blended-finance mechanisms. Strengthening revenue allocation to distribution companies and introducing performance-based regulation would further enhance investment attractiveness. Originality/value. This study contributes to the literature by providing one of the first empirically grounded assessments of investment attraction in Uzbekistan’s electricity supply enterprises, linking institutional reforms, tariff policy, and PPP-driven renewable energy investments within a unified analytical framework relevant to transition and emerging economies.

**INTRODUCTION**

Reliable and financially viable electricity supply systems constitute a fundamental pillar of economic growth, industrial productivity, and social welfare. In many transition economies, however, electricity supply enterprises—particularly those operating in transmission and distribution networks—continue to experience persistent underinvestment. This situation is largely driven by administratively regulated tariffs that remain below cost-recovery levels, elevated technical and commercial losses, and institutional arrangements that weaken incentives for efficiency and capital accumulation. Uzbekistan exhibits many of these structural characteristics.

Prior to the late 2010s, Uzbekistan’s power sector functioned under a vertically integrated and heavily subsidized framework, which constrained competition, limited operational efficiency, and discouraged private sector participation. Recognizing these systemic inefficiencies, the government launched a comprehensive reform agenda in 2019. Key measures included gradual tariff adjustments, functional unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution activities, and the introduction of competitive procurement mechanisms for new electricity capacity. Collectively, these reforms aimed to enhance revenue predictability for electricity supply enterprises and improve the overall investment climate in the sector.

According to assessments by the World Bank, electricity tariffs in Uzbekistan covered approximately 60% of economic costs before the reform process began. By the end of 2023, this figure had increased to around 75%, with official policy targets aiming for full cost recovery by 2026. In parallel, several large-scale renewable energy projects were awarded through transparent international tenders, indicating a gradual strengthening of investor confidence and institutional credibility.

Against this background, the present study seeks to identify the principal directions for attracting investment into electricity supply enterprises in Uzbekistan and to empirically examine the relationship between institutional reforms and investment outcomes over the period 2019–2024.

**Literature Review and Conceptual Framework**

Investment attraction in electricity supply enterprises occupies a prominent position in the literature on energy economics and infrastructure finance, particularly in emerging and transition economies where state-owned utilities have traditionally dominated the sector. A substantial body of research converges on the conclusion that regulatory effectiveness and institutional quality are decisive factors shaping investment flows in the power sector. Mundonde (2025), for instance, demonstrates that renewable energy PPP financing is strongly influenced by institutional robustness, macroeconomic stability, and the operational efficiency of transmission systems, underscoring the role of credible regulatory environments in mobilizing long-term private capital.

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are frequently identified as a key institutional mechanism for channeling private investment into energy infrastructure. Empirical evidence from developing economies suggests that renewable energy PPPs tend to attract significantly higher levels of private participation when supported by sound economic fundamentals and effective institutional arrangements. Fleta Asín et al. (2023) emphasize that the presence of multilateral development bank involvement further enhances investor confidence by mitigating political and contractual risks. Complementing this perspective, Qamruzzaman (2023) finds that coordinated public–private investment frameworks contribute positively to renewable energy expansion by improving demand aggregation and risk-sharing mechanisms within electricity systems.

Beyond the design of PPP frameworks, governance quality and regulatory coherence emerge as recurrent themes in the literature. Comprehensive assessments by the World Bank highlight that transparent contractual arrangements, regulatory consistency, and enforcement capacity are essential for attracting private investment and managing long-term project risks in the power sector. Countries characterized by predictable legal environments and credible regulatory institutions are consequently more successful in sustaining infrastructure investment over time.

Tariff policy reforms represent another central dimension of the investment discourse. Studies examining power sector reforms in developing economies consistently show that cost-reflective tariffs and stable pricing regimes are critical prerequisites for private investment, as they reduce revenue uncertainty and regulatory risk. Although much of this evidence is drawn from country-specific case studies—such as Ghana—the underlying principle that tariff adequacy and market-oriented pricing enhance investment attractiveness appears broadly applicable across electricity sectors.

The institutional finance literature further reinforces the importance of governance improvements. Cross-country analyses indicate that higher institutional quality—typically measured through indicators such as rule of law, regulatory effectiveness, and corruption control—significantly increases a country’s capacity to mobilize private capital for infrastructure development. This finding aligns with global assessments of renewable energy investment trends, which show that private capital accounts for a growing share of capacity expansion in jurisdictions offering stable policy frameworks and regulatory certainty.

In the context of electricity supply infrastructure in transition economies, PPP arrangements have gained prominence as tools for balancing public oversight with private sector efficiency. However, their effectiveness remains highly contingent on political commitment, administrative capacity, and regulatory clarity. Empirical studies focusing on post-socialist and developing economies highlight that bureaucratic complexity, weak coordination among institutions, and ambiguous regulatory mandates continue to impede investment, thereby reinforcing the need for comprehensive governance reforms alongside financial and technical policy measures.

Taken together, the literature identifies three interrelated pillars underpinning investment attraction in electricity supply enterprises: (i) strong institutional and regulatory frameworks that enhance investor confidence and reduce risk premiums; (ii) market-oriented reforms, including cost-reflective tariff structures, that secure predictable revenue streams; and (iii) PPP and blended finance mechanisms that facilitate risk sharing and leverage public resources to mobilize private capital. These pillars form the conceptual foundation for the empirical analysis of Uzbekistan’s electricity sector reforms presented in this study.

**DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

**Research Design.** This study adopts a mixed-method research design combining quantitative econometric analysis with qualitative institutional assessment. Such an approach is widely used in energy economics and infrastructure finance literature to analyze investment dynamics in sectors where purely market-based data are incomplete or distorted by regulation. The quantitative component aims to identify empirical relationships between institutional reforms and investment outcomes, while the qualitative component provides contextual interpretation of regulatory and policy developments in Uzbekistan’s electricity sector.

The empirical strategy is intentionally exploratory rather than predictive, reflecting both the relatively short post-reform period and the structural nature of electricity sector investments, which typically exhibit long gestation periods and delayed responses to policy changes.

**Data Sources.** The analysis relies exclusively on publicly available and verifiable data from reputable international institutions and official sources, ensuring transparency and reproducibility. The main data sources include:

* World Bank Group project documents and program information papers on power sector reforms, tariff policy, and distribution network modernization;
* International Finance Corporation (IFC) announcements and investment briefs related to renewable energy PPP projects in Uzbekistan;
* Asian Development Bank (ADB) reports on power sector restructuring and infrastructure financing;
* OECD/IEA Energy Policy Review of Uzbekistan (2022), providing comparative benchmarks and policy context;
* Official government decrees and reform strategies related to electricity sector unbundling and tariff adjustments.

Due to the absence of consistent, disaggregated annual data on capital expenditure at the level of individual electricity supply enterprises, the study constructs a proxy-based dataset that captures observable investment commitments rather than realized expenditures.

**Measurement of Investment Outcomes.** Direct investment flows into electricity transmission and distribution companies are often not fully disclosed in transition economies. To address this limitation, the study uses installed renewable energy capacity awarded through competitive public–private partnership (PPP) tenders as a proxy for investment attractiveness in the electricity supply sector.

This approach is justified on several grounds:

1. Large-scale renewable energy projects are capital-intensive and require reliable grid connection, long-term power purchase agreements, and credible off-take guarantees, all of which depend on the financial and institutional soundness of electricity supply enterprises.
2. International investors’ willingness to commit capital through PPP tenders reflects broader confidence in the regulatory environment, tariff policy, and contractual enforcement.
3. Similar proxy indicators have been widely used in the empirical literature on energy investment in emerging markets.

The dependent variable is defined as cumulative awarded renewable energy capacity (MW), which smooths short-term volatility and better captures long-term investment dynamics.

**Key Explanatory Variables.** The primary explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis are:

* Time trend (Timeₜ): A linear trend variable capturing the cumulative effect of gradual institutional reforms, learning effects, and reputation building over time.
* Tariff cost-recovery indicator (CostRecoveryₜ): A binary variable reflecting progress in electricity tariff reform. Based on World Bank documentation, the variable takes a value of 0.60 for the pre-reform and early reform period and 0.75 for the period following the 2023 tariff adjustment, which significantly improved cost recovery.

The tariff variable captures system-level financial sustainability rather than short-term price effects, aligning with theoretical expectations in regulated infrastructure sectors.

**Econometric Model Specification.** To examine the relationship between institutional reforms and investment outcomes, the following linear regression model is estimated:

(1)

where:

* represents cumulative renewable energy capacity awarded through PPPs (MW);
* denotes the time trend;
* reflects tariff cost-recovery improvements;
* is the stochastic error term.

Given the small sample size, the model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The objective is not to produce high-precision forecasts, but to assess directional relationships consistent with economic theory and institutional evidence.

**Constructed Dataset**

**Table 1.** Сonstructed dataset used in the empirical analysis.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Year** | **Annual awarded capacity (MW)** | **Cumulative capacity (MW)** | **Cost recovery** |
| 2019 | 100 | 100 | 0.60 |
| 2020 | 0 | 100 | 0.60 |
| 2021 | 440 | 540 | 0.60 |
| 2022 | 500 | 1040 | 0.60 |
| 2023 | 0 | 1040 | 0.75 |
| 2024 | 250 | 1290 | 0.75 |

This structure reflects the lumpy nature of infrastructure investment, where capacity additions occur in discrete project-based intervals rather than smoothly over time.

**Methodological Limitations.** Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the short observation period restricts statistical power and limits the ability to capture long-term lagged effects of tariff reforms. Second, the use of proxy variables may understate distribution-level investment dynamics, as generation-related projects dominate available data. Third, unobserved factors such as political risk perceptions and global capital market conditions are not explicitly modeled.

Despite these limitations, the methodology is appropriate for an early-stage empirical assessment of post-reform investment dynamics in a transition economy and provides a transparent foundation for future, more granular analyses.

**Methodological Contribution.** Methodologically, this study contributes to the literature by demonstrating how proxy-based investment indicators, combined with institutional analysis, can be used to empirically assess investment attraction in regulated infrastructure sectors where direct financial data are limited. This approach is particularly relevant for transition and emerging economies undergoing rapid energy sector reforms.

**RESULTS**

**Descriptive Results and Investment Dynamics.** The descriptive analysis provides clear evidence of a structural shift in private investment dynamics within Uzbekistan’s electricity sector following the initiation of comprehensive power sector reforms in 2019. Using cumulative renewable energy capacity awarded through competitive public–private partnership (PPP) tenders as an indicator of investment commitments, the results show a substantial increase from approximately 100 MW in 2019 to nearly 1,300 MW by 2024. This magnitude of growth reflects a notable strengthening of the sector’s investment attractiveness and suggests a gradual restoration of investor confidence in the institutional and regulatory framework governing electricity supply enterprises.

A key feature of the observed investment trajectory is its distinctly non-linear character. Rather than exhibiting smooth and continuous year-on-year expansion, investment activity is concentrated around specific periods marked by major policy actions and institutional events. In particular, large increases in awarded capacity coincide with competitive tender rounds, the standardization of contractual arrangements, and the achievement of financial close for large-scale projects. This pattern indicates that private investors respond primarily to discrete improvements in regulatory credibility and risk allocation, rather than to marginal or incremental policy adjustments.

The surge in investment commitments observed in 2021, when solar power projects exceeding 400 MW were awarded, illustrates the catalytic role of transparent and competitive procurement mechanisms. These tenders reduced information asymmetries, clarified grid-connection responsibilities, and established long-term power purchase agreements with predictable revenue streams. Subsequent increases in cumulative capacity in 2022 and 2024 further reflect the importance of financial closure and the availability of risk-mitigation instruments—such as guarantees and blended finance provided by international financial institutions—in converting announced projects into bankable investments.

From a sectoral perspective, the clustering of investment around major institutional milestones highlights the interdependence between electricity generation projects and the broader performance of electricity supply enterprises, particularly in transmission and distribution. Large-scale renewable energy investments implicitly require confidence in the ability of supply companies to ensure grid reliability, honor contractual obligations, and manage cash flows under evolving tariff regimes. Consequently, investment dynamics in renewable generation also serve as an indirect indicator of perceptions regarding the financial sustainability and operational capacity of electricity supply enterprises.

Moreover, the absence of significant investment additions in certain years does not necessarily indicate a deterioration in investment conditions. Instead, it reflects the inherently project-based nature of electricity infrastructure investment, where long development cycles, regulatory approvals, and financing negotiations create temporal gaps between policy reforms and observable capacity additions. This reinforces the view that electricity sector investment responds to institutional credibility over time, rather than to short-term fluctuations in policy variables.

Overall, the descriptive results underscore that investment attraction in Uzbekistan’s electricity sector is best understood as a process driven by episodic institutional breakthroughs rather than gradual policy evolution. The observed dynamics suggest that sustained investment growth will depend on the continuity of reform efforts, further enhancement of regulatory predictability, and the strengthening of financial and operational incentives for electricity supply enterprises, particularly at the distribution level.

**ECONOMETRIC RESULTS**

Table 1 reports the estimates obtained from the exploratory regression model designed to examine the association between investment outcomes in the electricity sector and key reform-related variables. In this specification, cumulative renewable energy capacity awarded through competitive PPP tenders is employed as a proxy for investment attractiveness, while the explanatory variables capture temporal dynamics and progress in tariff cost-recovery reforms.

The estimation results indicate that the coefficient associated with the time trend variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding suggests a systematic and sustained increase in investment commitments over the observation period. Economically, the significance of the time trend reflects the cumulative effect of sequential institutional reforms, learning processes among market participants, and the gradual strengthening of regulatory credibility. Rather than responding to isolated policy measures, private investors appear to internalize the broader reform trajectory when making long-term capital allocation decisions in the electricity sector.

By contrast, the coefficient on the tariff cost-recovery variable is positive but does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance. Although the estimated sign aligns with theoretical expectations—indicating that improvements in tariff adequacy are associated with stronger investment incentives—the absence of statistical significance implies that tariff reforms alone are insufficient to account for short-term fluctuations in observed investment volumes. This result highlights the limited explanatory power of contemporaneous tariff indicators in capturing the timing of large-scale infrastructure investment decisions.

The econometric outcome can be interpreted through the lens of investment irreversibility and regulatory expectations. Electricity infrastructure projects are characterized by high sunk costs and long payback periods, leading investors to place greater weight on anticipated future regulatory stability than on current tariff levels. Consequently, tariff reforms may exert their primary influence through expectations of long-run financial sustainability rather than through immediate changes in observed investment behavior.

Furthermore, the insignificance of the tariff variable underscores the role of complementary institutional mechanisms in shaping investment outcomes. The availability of long-term power purchase agreements, standardized contractual frameworks, and risk-mitigation instruments provided by international financial institutions likely mediates the relationship between tariff policy and investment. In this context, tariff reform functions as a necessary enabling condition, while institutional credibility and contractual enforcement determine whether investment commitments materialize.

Overall, the econometric results support the conclusion that investment attraction in Uzbekistan’s electricity sector is driven by a combination of long-term institutional evolution and policy credibility, rather than by isolated tariff adjustments. The findings reinforce the argument that reforms targeting regulatory predictability and risk allocation are at least as important as pricing reforms in mobilizing private capital for electricity supply enterprises.

**Interpretation of Results.** The econometric findings imply that tariff reform functions primarily as an enabling condition rather than a direct short-term driver of investment. Investors appear to respond more strongly to institutional credibility signals, such as transparent tender processes, enforceable long-term contracts, and the availability of risk-mitigation instruments provided by international financial institutions.

The absence of a statistically significant tariff effect in the short run should therefore not be interpreted as evidence against tariff reform. Instead, it highlights the importance of complementary measures that translate tariff adjustments into predictable cash flows for electricity supply enterprises, particularly at the distribution level. Without adequate revenue allocation mechanisms and performance-based incentives, tariff reforms may not immediately translate into increased investment.

**Institutional Results: Distribution-Level Constraints.** An important qualitative result emerging from the analysis concerns the revenue structure of electricity supply enterprises. Distribution companies capture a relatively small share of total electricity revenues, which limits their ability to finance capital expenditures and modernize network infrastructure. This structural constraint reduces the attractiveness of distribution-level investments, even in the presence of improved tariff cost recovery at the system level.

The results suggest that reforms targeting distribution companies—such as revising revenue allocation formulas, introducing regulatory asset base (RAB) mechanisms, and strengthening performance-based regulation—are critical for sustaining investment growth. Without such measures, large-scale generation investments may outpace network modernization, potentially creating bottlenecks and reliability risks.

**Robustness and Limitations.** Given the limited time horizon and the use of proxy indicators, the results should be interpreted with caution. The small sample size restricts the statistical power of the econometric analysis and limits the ability to capture lagged effects of tariff reforms. Nevertheless, the consistency between econometric outcomes and qualitative institutional evidence enhances the credibility of the findings.

Overall, the results indicate that investment attraction in Uzbekistan’s electricity supply enterprises is driven by a combination of long-term institutional reforms, credible PPP frameworks, and international risk-mitigation mechanisms, rather than by tariff adjustments alone.

**DISCUSSION**

The Uzbek experience illustrates that electricity supply enterprises become attractive to investors when financial reforms are combined with institutional trust and credible enforcement mechanisms. The absence of a statistically strong tariff effect in the short-run econometric model does not contradict the importance of tariff reform; rather, it reflects the lagged and expectations-driven nature of investment decisions in capital-intensive infrastructure sectors.

International experience suggests that strengthening distribution-level incentives and introducing performance-based regulation could further enhance investment flows. Without addressing distribution bottlenecks, large-scale generation investments may not translate into system-wide efficiency gains.

**CONCLUSIONS**

This study demonstrates that attracting investment into electricity supply enterprises in Uzbekistan requires a multidimensional strategy. Tariff reform remains a cornerstone of financial sustainability, but investment growth has been primarily driven by transparent PPP frameworks, IFI-backed risk mitigation, and institutional reforms.

Policy recommendations include:

Gradually increasing the revenue share allocated to distribution companies to support capital expenditure.

Expanding digital metering and billing reforms to reduce losses and improve cash collection.

Scaling blended finance and guarantee instruments for network-level investments.

Introducing performance-based regulation to align incentives with service quality and reliability.

These measures can enhance the long-term investment attractiveness of electricity supply enterprises and support Uzbekistan’s transition toward a sustainable and resilient power system.

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